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INTRODUCTION 
In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Gary 
Marchant anticipates how judges and juries are likely to 
perceive some of the liability issues that may arise when 
autonomous vehicles become implicated in personal injuries 
or property damage.1  In doing so, Professor Marchant 
implicitly acknowledges the uncertainty that tends to 
surround the application of tort law to emerging 
technologies.2  This Article emphasizes this uncertainty.  To 
borrow from screenwriter William Goldman, when predicting 
how tort law will interact with innovations, nobody knows 
anything—at least for a while.3  The precise content of the 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.  The author thanks 
Ryan Calo, Colleen Chien, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, and Brad Joondeph for 
their comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision 
Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1321  (2012). 
 2. See generally id. (frequently using the words “likely” or “unlikely” in 
describing the anticipated interplay between tort law and autonomous vehicles). 
 3. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE 39 (1983).  See 
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legal rules that will eventually coalesce around autonomous 
vehicles is likely to remain quite unclear for some time after 
these devices first appear on public highways.  And if the past 
provides any useful precedent here, the law pertaining to 
these vehicles may take at least one wrong turn before 
heading in what ultimately proves to be the right direction. 
The liability rules that come to surround an innovation 
do not spring immediately into existence, final and fully 
formed.  Instead, sometimes there are false starts and 
lengthy delays in the development of these principles.  These 
detours and stalls result from five recurring features of the 
interplay between tort law and new technologies, which also 
will provide the basic architecture for this Article.  First, the 
initial batch of cases presented to courts may be atypical of 
later lawsuits that implicate the innovation, yet relate rules 
with surprising persistence.  Second, these cases may be 
resolved by reference to analogies that rely on similarities in 
form, and which do not wear well over time.  Third, it may be 
difficult to isolate the unreasonable risks generated by an 
innovation from the benefits it is perceived to offer.  Fourth, 
claims by early adopters of the technology may be more 
difficult to recover upon than those that arise later, once the 
technology develops a mainstream audience.  Fifth, and 
finally, with regard to any particular innovation, it may be 
impossible to predict whether, and for how long, the recurring 
themes within tort law and its application that tend to yield a 
“grace” period for an invention will prevail over those 
tendencies with the opposite effect.  In short, it takes time for 
an innovation, such as autonomous vehicles, to become fully 
assimilated within everyday tort law, and one rarely can 
anticipate the precise timetable for this process, or its final 
results. 
 
also Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and 
Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 551 (2007) (“It is inevitable that legal 
disputes concerning [a] new technology will be handled under the preexisting 
legal scheme in early stages of technological development. At this stage, there 
often will not be enough information and knowledge about nascent technologies 
to develop or modify appropriate legal rules.”).  As I do here, Professor Mandel 
looked to the past for lessons applicable to the present; though the specific 
points I make diverge from his, I liked his approach, so I chose to adopt it. 
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I. ATYPICAL EARLY CLAIMS 
First, the initial cluster of lawsuits that surrounds an 
innovation may not resemble the claims that the device 
produces in its more mature state.4  The rules that emerge 
from these early cases, however, may persist even as the 
technology evolves and the risks it generates shift, swell, or 
subside. 
Consider, for example, the initial batch of negligence 
lawsuits that involved automobiles.5  These cases, dating 
from the very first years of the twentieth century, entailed 
none of the usual fodder for automobile litigation today: 
 They generally did not involve multi-car collisions—
there were not enough automobiles on the road at the 
time for these accidents to occur very often.6 
 Suits involving injured pedestrians also did not 
predominate, though they certainly were not unheard 
of; the reasons for this are less clear, but likely owed to 
the potency of the contributory negligence defense in 
that era.7 
 
 4. DANIEL C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 2 (1999) (“Inventions, 
when they are first introduced or patented, are typically very far from the form 
that they embody when they eventually achieve widespread diffusion; or, to put 
it differently, it is the improvements that they undergo that finally lead to 
widespread diffusion.”). 
 5. A robust discussion of early legislative oversight of the automobile lies 
beyond the scope of this essay.  For now, it suffices to say that some local 
ordinances pertinent to automobile use predated 1900.  See, e.g., Ordinance No. 
480, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Oct. 26, 1898, at 7 (relating a local ordinance 
that prescribed speed limits and rules of the road for different types of vehicles, 
including automobiles).  The first state laws specifically directed at automobiles 
appeared right around the turn of the century.  E.g., An Act to Amend the 
Highway Law, in Relation to the Use of Highways by Automobiles or Motor 
Vehicles and Requiring the Owners of Such Vehicles to Register With the 
Secretary of State, N.Y. STATS., 1901, ch. 531.  Long before that time, New York 
had added to its books a statute that regulated the use of steam traction 
engines on public highways.  An Act in Relation to Highways, Constituting 
Chapter Nineteen of the General Laws, N.Y. STATS. 1890, ch. 568, § 155. 
 6. There were fewer than 10,000 registered automobiles in the United 
States in 1900; by 1930, there were 23,034,753.  MOWERY & ROSENBERG, supra 
note 4, at 49. 
 7. See XENOPHON P. HUDDY, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 551607 (6th ed. 
1922) [hereinafter HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1922] (discussing how the 
contributory negligence of pedestrians affected their ability to recover in tort 
against the operator of a motor vehicle).  During this era, “In an action by a 
pedestrian to recover damages for an injury from an automobile, there [could] 
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 There also were few lawsuits brought by injured 
passengers against early automobile drivers.  This 
deficit owed in part to interspousal immunity rules, 
which were still vibrant at that time.8  Unspoken social 
norms also may have discouraged such suits, especially 
among the elite who comprised most early automobile 
owners,9 and perhaps these passengers also worried 
that if they brought suit, the driver would have a viable 
assumption of the risk or contributory negligence 
 
be, as a general proposition, no recovery unless the plaintiff was free from 
negligence which contributed to the injury.”  Id. at 552.  Some courts, though by 
no means all, held that it was “negligence per se on the part of a pedestrian to 
fail to look before attempting to cross a street.”  Id. at 56364.  Other 
jurisdictions were more generous to pedestrian plaintiffs (or their next of kin), 
but even so, the uncertainty that surrounded this sort of claim may have 
deterred marginal suits.  The slow speeds and noisy nature of many early 
automobiles also may help explain the dearth of pedestrian suits in 1900 and 
the years immediately thereafter.  See BEVERLY RAE KIMES, PIONEERS, 
ENGINEERS, AND SCOUNDRELS: THE DAWN OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN AMERICA 170 
(2005) (discussing the noisiness of early gasoline-powered vehicles); Automobile 
Brougham for a City Physician, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 1, 1899, at 6 
(discussing a new automobile produced by the Pope Manufacturing Company, 
and which claimed an average running speed of approximately eight miles per 
hour, and a maximum speed of eleven miles per hour). 
This said, even at the dawn of the automobile era, some pedestrians found 
themselves on the wrong end of a Locomobile.  Automobile historian Beverly 
Rae Kimes recounts one notable incident: 
One day on Fifth Avenue, while motoring at a sedate pace, [Mrs. 
Hamilton Fish] struck a pedestrian who got up and was brushing off 
his hat when she hit him again. In her excitement, the lady couldn’t 
remember which way to move the lever to stop and, after knocking the 
poor fellow down three times before finally figuring it out, she left the 
car there and found another way home. 
KIMES, supra, at 94.  See also Topics of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1901, at 
8 (remarking upon “[t]hose rather numerous people who have been killed in the 
streets of this city by automobiles driven at reckless speed”); Automobile Wins 
Damage Suit, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 23, 1901, at 16 (reporting on a defense 
verdict in a personal-injury lawsuit brought by the mother of a boy who had 
been run over by an automobile). 
 8.   See HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1922, supra note 7, at 880 
(observing that “it is doubtful if a wife [riding in a vehicle] can recover such 
damages from her husband with whom she was cohabitating at the time of the 
injury”); Elizabeth Katz, How Automobile Accidents Stalled the Development of 
Interspousal Liability, 94 VA. L. REV. 1213, 122429 (2008) (discussing the 
status of interspousal tort immunity, circa 1900); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort 
Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 383 (1989) (same). 
 9. For one of many observations that early automobile owners tended to be 
wealthy, see H.B. Brown, The Status of the Automobile, 17 YALE L.J. 223, 230 
(1909) (“Automobiles are usually owned by men of wealth, to whom ordinary 
fines are of no consequence.”). 
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defense.10 
 Finally, there were few (if any) lawsuits brought 
against automobile manufacturers, in which plaintiffs 
complained of negligently constructed vehicles.11 
Possibly, these suits were suppressed by a sense that a 
lack of contractual privity with the manufacturer 
would defeat a claim, except in rare circumstances.12  
Yet many early automobile consumers purchased their 
vehicles directly from the manufacturer,13 such that 
any privity rule, on its own, would not have precluded 
lawsuits these buyers might have been inclined to file. 
Also, some scholars have questioned whether a lack of 
privity was ever widely regarded as a pre-emptive bar 
 
 10. For some time, the duties of an automobile passenger qua passenger 
were quite unclear.  A 1927 treatise, for example, observed that while 
“ordinarily, a guest, especially if he is sitting in the rear seat of an automobile, 
may rely upon the capacity of his host as a competent driver,” at the same time, 
“it is the duty of a passenger in another’s automobile to warn the driver of 
danger which he sees or which in the exercise of ordinary care he should see,” 
and even “a gratuitous guest in an automobile cannot idly sit by, observe clear 
violations of the law by operating the automobile at excessive speed or 
otherwise, and acquiesce in it and then hold the driver or the owner liable for 
damages resulting from such violation.”  DEWITT C. BLASHFIELD, 2 
BLASHFIELD’S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW 1086–87 (1927).  Though these 
rules were far from universally recognized and applied, that is not the point; as 
the text above argues, uncertainty, on its own, can deter lawsuits. 
 11. See XENOPHON P. HUDDY, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 103 (1906) 
[hereinafter HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1906] (“Among the many reported 
judicial decisions concerning motoring and the motor car, no reported case in 
reference to the manufacturer’s part played in automobiling has as yet 
appeared,” even though “[n]o person is more intimately connected with 
motoring, and of so vital importance in qualifications, as the manufacturer.”). 
 12. C.B., Negligence—Liability of Manufacturer to Third Parties—Nature of 
the Goods as Test—MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. (N.Y.) 1050, 25 
YALE L.J. 679, 679 (1916).  The leading treatise of the time, Xenophon Huddy’s 
The Law of Automobiles, supposed that negligence liability might adhere to the 
manufacturer of an automobile, but also noted another treatise-writer’s 
recitation of the privity bar.  HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1906, supra note 
11, at 10506. 
 13. ROBERT GENAT, THE AMERICAN CAR DEALERSHIP 17 (2004).  Some of 
these manufacturers had to issue their own express warranties to convince 
buyers that their products were safe.  Xenophon P. Huddy, The Legal Aspect of 
Automobile Engineering, THE HORSELESS AGE, Nov. 7, 1906, at 674 (discussing 
the law of express and implied warranties as they apply to automobiles); 
Irresponsible Guarantees, THE HORSELESS AGE, Apr. 17, 1901, at 48 (observing 
that manufacturers of automobiles were guaranteeing their products against 
accidents resulting from “defective worksmanship and material,” but expressing 
the suspicion that the manufacturers of some low-priced vehicles were offering 
these warranties but “expect to extricate themselves in some manner from the 
obligations which such guarantees involve”). 
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to suits that attacked the negligent construction of a 
mass-marketed good.14  It may be equally likely that 
uncertainty regarding precisely what amounted to the 
negligent design or construction of a device that was as 
novel and fast-evolving as the automobile dissuaded 
injured parties from filing suit. 
So, if none of the modern automobile-lawsuit categories 
predominated back in 1900, what did?  The answer: most 
early automobile cases involved claims that the sight or 
sound of a motor carriage caused a horse to take fright, 
resulting in injury either to the horse’s rider, the occupants of 
a carriage or wagon the horse had been towing, or the horse 
itself.15 
 
 14. Gary T. Schwartz, Cardozo as Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 
310 (1998) (“I am unaware of any [case prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)] in England or New York in which the privity 
doctrine had shielded a mass-producing manufacturer from liability for an 
injury suffered by the ultimate consumer.”).  Indeed, in the first reported case in 
which a manufacturer’s liability for an automobile sold through a distributor 
was an issue, Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1911), the 
appellate court found that a lack of privity did not bar recovery for an 
automobile manufacturer’s negligence.  Id. at 1051.  The first significant 
decision to the contrary (Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2d Cir. 
1915)), which appeared four years later, was not regarded at the time as the 
inevitable outgrowth of well-settled principles.  See Favors Cadillac in Broken 
Wheel Case, THE HORSELESS AGE, Mar. 17, 1915, at 361 (reporting on the 
decision, and discussing the possibility of a petition for writ of certiorari being 
filed). 
 15. Some Leading Automobile Suits, THE HORSELESS AGE, Nov. 5, 1902, at 
512 (reporting on known tort suits involving automobiles, the vast majority of 
which involved frightened horses); For and Against the Auto, THE WASH. POST, 
Aug. 17, 1902, at 17 (observing that “[m]ore [auto-related] accidents have been 
caused by the frightening of restive horses . . . than in any other way”).  See also 
Murphy v. Wait, 92 N.Y.S. 253, 254 (App. Div. 1905) (commenting upon 
frequent frightened-horse lawsuits); HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1906, supra 
note 11, at 19 (“That the automobile has a tendency to frighten horses 
unaccustomed to its appearance must be conceded. This has been one of the 
worst obstacles to motoring and driving, and has been the cause of much 
litigation.”).  For specific frightened-horse cases from this era, see Indiana 
Springs Co. v. Brown, 74 N.E. 615 (Ind. 1905); Shinkle v. McCullough, 77 S.W. 
196 (Ky. 1903); Mason v. West, 65 N.Y.S. 651 (C.C.N.Y.1900), rev’d, 70 N.Y.S. 
478 (N.Y.A.D. 1901); An Interesting Automobile Damage Case, SCI. AM., Dec. 21, 
1901, at 407; Suit Over Motor Vehicle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1901, at 16 (“For the 
first time yesterday the Supreme Court tried a suit involving the alleged use of 
chauffeurs in driving a motor vehicle along a public highway and by its presence 
frightening a horse and causing physical injury.”); Damage Suit at Providence, 
THE HORSELESS AGE, Nov. 15, 1899, at 8 (reporting on two civil suits arising 
out of a frightened-horse incident).  Due to these lawsuits, some insurers 
refused to issue policies to the operators of early steam-powered automobiles 
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Though these cases come across as idiosyncratic today, 
they seemed both obvious and propitious to McKinley-era 
plaintiffs.16  For one thing, plaintiffs in these matters could 
draw upon a large body of frightened-horse caselaw of 
relatively recent vintage.17  These cases specified the fact 
patterns that would and would not suffice for a viable 
negligence claim.  More subtly, the substantial volume of 
frightened-horse cases communicated to persons injured 
under similar circumstances that they had suffered a harm 
that just might lead to a recovery in tort.18  In other words, 
when an automobile frightened a horse, those injured19 often 
could appreciate the existence of a tort claim (as opposed to 
merely damnum absque injuria), and evaluate the likelihood 
of success with some precision. 
On this latter point, at the very outset of the automobile 
age some of the caselaw associated with frightened-horse 
claims seemed quite favorable to plaintiffs.  Though there 
existed a split of opinion on this issue, some courts subscribed 
to the position that the defendant’s mere operation of a 
vehicle likely to frighten horses on a public highway created a 
jury question as to whether he breached his duty of 
 
(while making policies available to owners of other types of motor cars) “because 
records have proven that horses are more easily frightened by escaping steam 
than by any other cause.”  Automobile News, SCI. AM., Nov. 15, 1902, at 327. 
 16. See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 371, 39092 (1990) (describing how “intervening factors” influence 
whether, and how many cases within a particular “case congregation” are filed, 
including the level (frequency) of the activity, “the presence of rights, standards, 
doctrine, and norms that promise some success to the litigant,” and awareness 
that a grievance exists). 
 17. E.g., Thompson v. Dodge, 60 N.W. 545 (Minn. 1894); Holland v. Bartch, 
22 N.E. 83 (Ind. 1889).  Much, though not all of this caselaw concluded that 
other vehicles could be lawfully operated along a highway, notwithstanding a 
propensity to frighten horses.  E.g., Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212 (1876) 
(finding error in a lower-court instruction to the effect that if the jury were to 
find that a steam engine, being operated on a highway, “was well calculated to 
frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover”; 
holding instead that liability requires a dearth of reasonable care in the 
operation of the vehicle). 
 18. See Galanter, supra note 16, at 377 (identifying a plaintiff’s awareness 
of a grievance as being among the factors that contribute to the beginning of a 
“case career”). 
 19. Many people were injured due to horse-automobile interactions.  The 
number of horse-related fatalities in New York City increased by almost fifty 
percent between 1899 and 1907, an uptick that likely includes increased 
automobile use among its causes.  CLAY MCSHANE & JOEL A. TARR, THE HORSE 
IN THE CITY: LIVING MACHINES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 168 (2007). 
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reasonable care.20  The plaintiffs in some early frightened-
horse cases that involved automobiles made similar 
arguments.21  Indeed, one of the very first appellate opinions 
to consider the liability of an automobile driver to the owner 
of a frightened horse followed this lead.22 
These frightened-horse cases would make for an 
interesting anecdote, and little more, except for the fact that 
they produced automobile-friendly rules with staying power.  
Turn-of-the-century judges and juries knew that any new 
contrivance on the highways could frighten a horse23—as the 
earlier caselaw (which had involved sources of highway terror 
 
 20. E.g., McCann v. Consolidated Traction Co., 36 A. 888, 889 (N.J. Err. & 
App. 1897); Jones v. Snow, 57 N.W. 478 (Minn. 1894) (finding a jury issue 
regarding negligence when the defendant’s “wagon was so arranged and 
decorated as to readily frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, and that the 
display was not such as was really necessary for carrying on defendant’s 
business, except in the way of advertising it.”).  But see Thompson v. Dodge, 60 
N.W. 545, 546 (Minn. 1894) (rejecting a plaintiff’s negligence theory on the 
ground that there was “no allegation in the complaint that the defendant knew, 
or had any reason to believe or anticipate, that plaintiff’s horse would be 
frightened at defendant’s bicycle, or the manner in which he was riding the 
same”).  Suggestions to the effect that a negligence claim might lie when a 
driver operated a vehicle built or modified “as to suggest to a reasonably 
prudent person that it would frighten or terrify an ordinary horse” did not 
disappear entirely for many years after the introduction of the automobile, 
though in later cases the concept was mostly raised only in dictum.  Pease v. 
Cochran, 173 N.W. 158, 159–60 (N.D. 1919). 
 21. See, e.g., An Interesting Automobile Damage Case, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, Dec. 21, 1901, at 407 (reciting, as one of the allegations in the 
complaint in an early frightened-horse case, that “the electric vehicle was 
noiseless in its running qualities, but calculated by its peculiar appearance to 
frighten horses of ordinary gentleness.”). 
 22. Mason v. West, 70 N.Y.S. 478, 479–80 (N.Y.A.D. 1901).  See also Col. 
Hughes Wins His Suit, THE HAMILTON (OH) WKLY. SUN, Oct. 9, 1902, at 1 
(relating a case in which the jury was charged that a driver of an automobile 
must exercise “peculiar care lest he cause horses to take fright,” and in which 
the jury returned a $12,070 verdict for the plaintiff).  Quite quickly, a general 
rule emerged that the driver of an automobile would not be liable in negligence 
if the plaintiff could only establish that his horse was frightened by the sight of 
the motor car.  More was necessary, such as a showing of excessive speed; facts 
suggesting that the driver knew or should have known of a particular horse’s 
frightened state, and then failed to take appropriate countermeasures; or a 
failure to obey the horse-automobile code of etiquette that many states 
incorporated within their hastily prepared automobile laws.  HUDDY, LAW OF 
AUTOMOBILES 1906, supra note 11, at 4851.  For a typical statutory provision 
governing horse-automobile encounters, see N.Y. STATS. 1901, ch. 531, § 169. 
 23. See Bicycles and Horses, THE BUCKS COUNTY (PA) GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 
1881, at 1 (listing, among things known to frighten horses, “an umbrella over a 
short woman’s head . . . a boy sitting on the roadside . . . a wheelbarrow . . . even 
. . . a man on horseback.”). 
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as varied as bicycles,24 trolley cars,25 and elephants26) had 
demonstrated.  It also was understood that as time passed 
and animals became more familiar with a device, the number 
of accidents attributable to frightened horses would 
decrease.27  Thus there was less need for stringent judicial 
regulation; if automobiles were more than a passing fad,28 
 
 24. E.g., Holland v. Bartch, 22 N.E. 83 (Ind. 1889); Notes, THE FORT WAYNE 
WORLD, Apr. 25, 1885, at 1 (commenting on a defense verdict in a lawsuit in 
which a bicycle was alleged to have frightened a horse).  For a discussion of the 
law that came to surround bicycle use during the 1880s and 1890s, see Ross D. 
Petty, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycling on American Safety Law, 35 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 185 (1998). 
 25. E.g., Chapman v. Zanesville Street Ry. Co., 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 492 
(Ohio Common Pleas 1892). 
 26. Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).  See also Means for 
Checking Runaway Horses, THE HORSELESS AGE, Sept. 11, 1901, at 490 (listing 
some of the stimuli known to frighten horses). 
 27. In Gilbert v. Flint & P.M. R. Co., 16 N.W. 868 (Mich. 1883), for example, 
the court related that “[w]e have street-cars, and steam fire-engines, and steam 
threshing-machines, but horses readily become familiar with them, and serious 
frights are exceedingly rare and entirely exceptional.  As objects calculated to 
alarm horses, the rule is in favor of their harmlessness.”  Id. at 869.  The Gilbert 
court then added: 
If a standing freight car should be deemed as dangerous as here 
represented, it would be impossible to consider these machines and 
vehicles as fit to appear on the highway.  Moreover, the reason would 
apply to a thousand customary and convenient modes of use of our 
ordinary highways, which have always been exempt from such 
doctrine, and which must remain exempt unless we are prepared to 
surrender a large and valuable portion of our rights connected with the 
public thoroughfares. 
 Id.  Judges’ charges to juries in frightened-horse cases from the early 
automobile era often touched on this theme.  For example, one judge instructed 
a jury: 
Far be it from us to have any prejudice against a horseless carriage. . . .  
The automobile has as much right in the street as the horse has.  The 
bicycle used to be under the ban, but nobody now thinks of having any 
ill feeling against the bicycle.  The same way the improvement of the 
automobile is good. 
 The Law of the Road for Automobiles, THE HORSELESS AGE, Apr. 24, 1901, at 
73. 
 28. Early observers considered it quite possible that automobile use was 
only a short-lived craze, much like the bicycling fad of the 1890s.  E.g., Bitter 
Fight All Over the Country Against Automobiles, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 17, 
1902, at 39 (“The mass of the population still is prone to consider automobilism 
almost entirely as a sport, a luxury, or a fad.”).  This perception had an 
important influence on the early regulation of automobiles.  As one 
contemporary commentator observed: 
The stages through which the law has passed regarding automobilism 
has been much the same in every country, and the changes have 
faithfully represented public opinion.  First of all, there has been the 
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then the problem would resolve on its own.29  Accordingly, 
courts swiftly and soundly rejected the view that operation of 
an automobile on a public highway might, by itself, amount to 
negligence simply because the vehicle was prone to frighten 
horses.30  Moreover, rulings in early frightened-horses cases 
also snuffed out any prospect that automobiles would be 
regarded as nuisances,31 or that their owners would be subject 
to strict liability for harms associated with their use.32 
 
stage of contemptuous indifference or disbelief, legislatures having at 
one time held that it was quite unnecessary to legislate for vehicles 
which were never likely to become numerous or practical.  This stage 
has been generally followed by fear and by inability to understand the 
immensely greater power of control in mechanical than in animal 
traction; and that again has been followed by jealous dislike of and 
prejudice against a system of propulsion which is contrary to the ideas 
of all previous generations.  The third stage has been often marked by 
panic legislation, due to the fact that the increase of motor-cars has 
been so rapid in some countries that a new political and social force has 
arisen, which is feared by those who love to cling to old ideas. 
John Scott-Montagu, Automobile Legislation: A Criticism and Review, THE N. 
AM. REV., Aug. 1904, at 168. 
 29. Means for Checking Runaway Horses, supra note 26, at 490 (“It is to be 
expected that horses will soon become accustomed to automobiles, just as they 
have to bicycles, and that runaway accidents due to these vehicles will then be 
very rare.”); Rights of the Automobile, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1899, at 2 (“the 
curiosity of the horse is easily satisfied, and when he learns that the new style 
of vehicle is no more dangerous than any other, he will cease to regard it with 
fear, or even with suspicion”). 
 30. HUDDY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 1906, supra note 11, at 4851 (relating 
cases).  See also FORT WAYNE MORNING J.-GAZETTE, May 25, 1901, at 4 (“The 
courts now decide, that, when a horse frightens at an automobile and runs 
away, smashing things, it is the fault of the horse not the automobile.”). 
 31. E.g., The Automobile Not a Nuisance, THE HORSELESS AGE, Sept. 26, 
1900, at 10 (reporting on a jury verdict in a lawsuit that alleged that operation 
of an automobile on a public highway amounted to a nuisance). 
 32. E.g., Lewis v. Amorous, 59 S.E. 338, 340 (Ga. App. 1907) (“It is not the 
ferocity of automobiles that is to be feared, but the ferocity of those who drive 
them.  They are not to be classed with bad dogs, vicious bulls, and evil disposed 
mules and the like.”).  This outcome seems obvious now, but that wasn’t 
necessarily the case back in 1900.  See Torts – Liability Without Intent or 
Negligence - Operation of Defective Automobile, 34 HARV. L. REV. 564, 564 
(1921) (considering whether strict liability should apply to the operation of an 
automobile).  Particularly given that many early automobile owners were 
among the nation’s ultra-rich, the possibility of a strict-liability regime to 
govern automobile use was not all that far-fetched.  See KIMES, supra note 7, at 
92 (“Who bought automobiles?  Prior to the turn of the century, they were, most 
conspicuously, the same people who owned private railroad cars, had stables for 
at least twenty carriages at their estates on Long Island, and summered at their 
opulent ‘cottages’ in Newport.”).  Id. at 152 (observing that as of 1900, only 
4,000 Americans owned automobiles, with this number rising to 40,000 by 
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In other words, these frightened-horse cases yielded a 
cluster of forgiving liability rules premised on the belief that 
automobiles represented an unexceptional addition to the 
continuum of new technologies that had appeared on the 
 
1904).  Id. at 189 (quoting future President Woodrow Wilson as stating, in 1906, 
“Nothing has spread socialistic feeling in this country more than the 
automobile,” as “to the countryman they are a picture of the arrogance of 
wealth, with all its independence and carelessness.”).  The saving graces, for 
automobiles, were threefold.  First, their beneficial uses were quite obvious, 
assuming that they would reach a price point at which they would be more 
generally available.  See, e.g., The Status of the Horse at the End of the Century, 
HARPER’S WKLY., Nov. 18, 1899, at 1172 (“We must expect, as electricity and 
steam and gasoline and compressed air are more and more used to propel all 
sorts of vehicles, that the number of horses in the world will diminish.”); 
Comparative Operating Cost of Horse and Electric Delivery Wagons, SCI. AM., 
July 22, 1899, at 50 (comparing the cost-effectiveness of electric motor vehicles, 
relative to horses); Horseless Carriages Are Clearing the Way, S.F. CALL, Aug. 
14, 1898, at 23 (describing the many anticipated uses of motor carriages, even 
though the “vehicle is hardly likely to ever come into general use in San 
Francisco on account of the hills”).  Second, the automobile’s principal 
substitute, the horse, hardly had a spotless safety record of its own.  See Eric 
Morris, From Horse Power to Horsepower, 30 ACCESS 2, 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.uctc.net/access/30/Access%2030%20-%2002%20-%20Horse%20Power 
.pdf (noting that in New York City, circa 1900, 200 people died in accidents 
involving horses and horse-drawn vehicles, as compared to 344 auto-related 
fatalities in that same city in 2003); Dangers of the Automobile, As Tested in 
France by a Monthly Record, Do Not Exceed Those of the Bicycle and Form a 
Surprisingly Small Proportion of the Perils Always Imminent in the Street, S.F. 
CALL, June 22, 1901, at 6.  On the relative safety profiles of horses and 
automobiles, the opinion expressed in Automobile Ordinances, WATERLOO (IA) 
COURIER, Dec. 15, 1902, at 4, is typical of the era: 
The progress of civilization constantly demands better methods of 
performing any service and in this progress the motor vehicle is sure to 
be accepted as substitute for the horse.  It should be kept in mind that 
not only is the motor vehicle cleaner, faster and less destructive to the 
streets but it is far safer than a horse.  It never frights, will not kick 
and always responds to the will of the driver instantly.  Not only may it 
start quicker and travel faster, but it may likewise be stopped quicker 
than a horse vehicle, while its ability to turn quickly, thus avoiding 
danger is also very great.  These facts render an automobile one of the 
safest means of traveling. 
Third, the carnage wrought by the automobile was commensurate with its use; 
the fears regarding automobile use were somewhat abstract (and offset, 
perhaps, by the hope among those who feared these vehicles that they also 
might own one, someday) until bodies started to pile up.  Compare KIMES, supra 
note 7, at 189 (“As more and more cars appeared on the road, so did public 
hostility against them.”), with Harry C. Marillier, The Automobile: A Forecast, 
in THE ECLECTIC MAG. OF FOREIGN LITERATURE 774, 774 (1895) (“[I]t is 
probable that in a year or two every one will be wanting to drive without horses, 
and to scour the open country at sweet will in a vehicle that can match the 
bicycle for lightness and for speed, while saving the superfluous element of 
labor.”). 
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highways.  Similar principles might have emerged even had a 
different type of tort case predominated at the dawn of the 
automobile age.  Yet it is also possible that had the first batch 
of automobile lawsuits introduced a seemingly endless parade 
of mangled pedestrians, this carnage would have produced a 
regime that entailed enhanced oversight over automobile use.  
Instead, a deferential system emerged and then persisted,33 
even as time passed and the number of automobiles and the 
associated body count both soared.34 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF REASONING BY ANALOGY 
Second, just as the types of lawsuits that implicate a 
technology tend to change over time, the sorts of reasoning 
used to resolve these cases also may evolve.  More specifically, 
as Professor Gregory Mandel and others have observed, in 
resolving disputes that involve a new device, courts often 
focus on similarities in form between the innovation and 
existing technologies.35  Over time, however, these analogies 
tend to give way to analysis that incorporates a more 
thoughtful consideration of the risk profiles presented by the 
invention. 
The early application of defamation law to broadcasts by 
radio and television offers one example of such a transition.  
The question of whether defamation communicated by way of 
radio or television should be regarded as libel, or as slander, 
vexed courts for decades.  The distinction matters because it 
is easier to recover for libel than for slander.36  In trying to 
place these new technologies in the proper slot (the notion of 
 
 33. For a discussion of the persistence of legal rules within the judicial 
system even as circumstances change, see generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
 34. Automobiles were responsible for more than 200,000 deaths during the 
1920s.  PETER D. NORTON, FIGHTING TRAFFIC: THE DAWN OF THE MOTOR AGE IN 
THE AMERICAN CITY 21 (2008). 
 35. See Mandel, supra note 3, at 55357 (relating how early cases involving 
telegraphy embraced simple analogies instead of any thoughtful consideration 
of the “rationale for the existing legal categories in the first instance”). 
 36. Harold M. Halpern, Defamation via Television Ad Lib; Libel and 
Slander Distinctions, 6 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 325–26 (1956) (“Libel is actionable 
without proof of damages, while slander is actionable only if there is proof of 
special damages, viz: a pecuniary loss, unless the defamation is within the 
narrow category known as slander per se.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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a third category never having caught on37), precedent and 
policy were at odds.  On the one hand, black-letter law 
provides that slander involves aural communications, 
whereas libel entails printed material.38  This rule supports 
the treatment of defamation by radio and television as 
slander, since both rely upon sound for their publication.39  At 
the same time, the more liberal standard for recovery for libel 
recognizes that words on the printed page tend to reach a 
broad audience, as radio and television broadcasts did.40  This 
distinction points in the direction of treating defamation by 
radio and television as libel.41 
Courts that wrestled with this conflict in the early days 
of radio and television reached some awkward compromises.  
Among them, some courts held that if a radio broadcast had 
been read from a script, it was libel; otherwise, it was 
slander.42  This approach satisfied few;43 one commentator 
 
 37. One court did create a third type of defamation to cover these 
circumstances, labeled “defamacast.”  Am. Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, 
Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. 1962).  For a discussion of the tendency of 
courts to shoehorn new technologies into existing frameworks, see Mandel, 
supra note 3, at 553, 564 (observing that “there often appears to be an 
inclination to handle new technology disputes under existing rules.”). 
 38. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
785 (student ed. 1984).  Moreover, early radio and television broadcasts 
resembled slander in that they lacked permanence, at least among their broad 
audiences. 
 39. For an example of an authority that adopted this view, see Stuart 
Sprague, Freedom of the Air, 8 AIR L. REV. 30, 43 (193738) (“It is believed that 
as long as a distinction exists between libel and slander all radio defamations 
should be deemed slander and not libel whether the speaker reads from a 
manuscript or speaks extemporaneously or from memory”). 
 40. See, e.g., Defamation by Radio, 30 LAW NOTES 3 (1926) (“The law of 
slander is . . . inadequate when applied to radio broadcasting, where the 
speaker is consciously addressing an audience which may be greater than the 
circulation of any newspaper.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Halpern, supra note 36, at 32526 (citing cases).  See also RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS § 568 cmt. f (1938) (observing that “[a] libel may be published by 
broadcasting over the air by means of the radio, if the speaker reads from a 
prepared manuscript or speaks from written or printed notes or memoranda.”)  
This treatise further provides that when a radio broadcast contains 
extemporaneously spoken defamatory content, whether it amounts to libel or 
slander hinges on factors enumerated in section 568(3) of the Restatement, 
namely, “the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character 
of its publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct.”  Id. at § 
568(3), cmt. f. 
 43. To play devil’s advocate here, one policy argument in favor of this 
halfway approach would note that written defamation “is an act of deliberation” 
4_GRAHAM FINAL 11/15/2012  8:50 PM 
1254 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
observed that “to say that one may recover if the defamation 
is read from a script, even though unknown to the listener, 
but may not recover if an ad lib, is unrealistic.”44  Some of 
these critics preferred an approach that focused on the scope 
of the risks created by the media, under which defamation by 
radio and television “should be held libel because of the great 
capacity it has to harm one’s reputation.”45  Eventually, most 
courts gravitated toward the view that policy trumps form—
meaning that defamation by radio and television constitute 
libel.46  Yet this transition took decades to occur.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ discussion of defamation by 
radio and television, published in 1977, described the cases on 
the subject as still being “divided and confused.”47  
Furthermore, some statutes enacted early in the development 
of these media, under which defamation by radio and 
television are considered slander, remain in place today.48 
An arguably similar story surrounds airplanes.  Ground 
damage attributable to fallen aircraft long was considered one 
of the rare circumstances in which strict liability, as opposed 
to negligence, would provide the appropriate rule.  This 
approach dates back to Guille v. Swan, an 1822 case that 
involved hot-air ballooning.49  After the Wright brothers’ 
fateful flight, commentators assumed that Guille’s strict-
liability rule for ground damage would apply to motorized 
aircraft.50  Both balloons and airplanes rose to, and fell from, 
 
that merits a more potent response, in a way that extemporaneously spoken 
words over the radio or television may not be.  Defamation by Radio, supra note 
40, at 3. 
 44. Halpern, supra note 36, at 327. 
 45. Id. at 328. 
 46. See McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 751 A.2d 1066, 1076 
(N.J. Super. A.D. 2000) (“The consensus elsewhere seems to be that radio and 
television broadcasts should be categorized as libel.”). 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
 48. For example, California Civil Code sections 46 and 48.5, under which 
defamation by radio and television are regarded as slander, were enacted back 
in 1945 and 1949, when form reigned.  An Act to Add Section 48.5 to the Civil 
Code, Relating to Defamation by Radio, STATS. 1949, ch. 1258, § 1; An Act to 
Amend Sections 46, 47, 48, and 48a of the Civil Code and Add a New Section to 
the Civil Code, to Be Numbered 45a, Relating to Libel and Slander, CAL. STATS. 
1945, ch. 1489, § 2. 
 49. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). 
 50. E.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation, 9 
MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1910); HAROLD H. HAZELTINE, THE LAW OF THE AIR: 
THREE LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON AT THE REQUEST 
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the sky, after all; and the plaintiffs in such cases presumably 
would be equally blameless.  Suitably, the Restatement of 
Torts endorsed strict liability for ground damage caused by 
aircraft crashes.51  This view proved remarkably persistent, 
even as commercial aviation became commonplace and its 
safety record improved.52  After a pitched debate, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts retained the strict-liability 
rule.53  Only relatively recently has a critical mass of courts 
and commentators determined that airline operators, given 
their relatively benign safety profile, should be subject to a 
liability rule for ground damage that is no more stringent 
 
OF THE FACULTY OF LAWS 8687 (1911).  Two issues dominated early 
conversations regarding tort law and airplanes: how to reconcile manned flight 
with the ad coelum doctrine, see generally STUART BANNER, WHY OWNS THE 
SKY? (2008) (describing the lengthy struggle to reconcile air traffic with the 
general principle that one who owns land also owns the skies above it), and the 
concern that individuals, minding their own business upon the ground, would 
suddenly be crushed from above by an airplane as it plummeted to the earth.  
On this latter point, one early article on the legal implications of flight began 
with the remark, “It cannot be long before the American courts will be called 
upon to decide whether aeronauts, who cause damage by a descent to the earth, 
are liable at all events, or only when chargeable with negligence or want of 
skill.”  Baldwin, supra note 50, at 20.  The author argued for application of strict 
liability, as the aeronaut was engaging “in a dangerous pursuit” solely “for his 
own advantage or amusement”; this being the case, “he ought to be held 
responsible for whatever misadventures, of a kind not unusual in such a 
pursuit, may befall him.”  Id. at 21.  See also HAZELTINE, supra, at 8288 
(discussing the possibility that planes will crash-land, injuring persons on the 
ground, and the preferable liability rule to apply in such circumstances); Arthur 
K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aerial Law, 4 AM. J. INT’L LAW 109, 128 (1910) 
(“The opening of the airspace to the aerial navigator brings with it . . . 
concomitant responsibility.  The law of gravitation is constant and inevitable 
and he who seeks temporarily to overcome its effects must reckon with an 
extraordinary responsibility for injuries to person or property in the event of 
failure.”).  And indeed, some of first tort suits to involve flight involved injuries 
to persons on the ground.  E.g., Morrison v. Fisher, 152 N.W. 475 (Wis. 1915) 
(ruling on an appeal in a case arising out of an air-show accident, in which the 
jury below had ruled for the defendant aviator, finding him not negligent). 
 51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938). 
 52. In fairness, there were a few early dissenters from the orthodox view.  
E.g., George W. Lupton, Jr., Progress of Aviation Law, AVIATION, Feb. 1933, at 
43.  “The difference between a balloon, at the sport of the winds, and an 
airplane or airship, ordinarily easily controlled, is obvious.  The former is 
inherently dangerous, the latter is less dangerous than the automobile or the 
train, if competently operated.”  Id. 
 53. The history of the strict-liability rule and the debates surrounding its 
retention in the Restatement (Second) of Torts are related in the Reporter’s 
Note to Comment k to section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2010).  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. k reporter’s note (2010). 
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than the one applied to, for example, automobile drivers.54 
That early courts tend to seize upon analogies based on 
similarities in form is not surprising; until an invention 
matures and becomes more broadly diffused among 
consumers, its ultimate risk profile cannot be predicted with 
accuracy. In any event, the net effect of this tendency is 
difficult to predict.  As the juxtaposition of the radio and 
airplane examples demonstrate, simplistic early analogies do 
not always favor plaintiffs.  These cases may produce rules 
that are later rejected as too deferential (as in the case of 
radio and television) or as too harsh (as with airplanes) to the 
new technology.  That is, if they are ever rejected at all.55 
III. SEPARATING THE GOOD FROM THE BAD 
Third, the aspects of an innovation that involve 
unreasonable risks often prove difficult to identify, to 
segregate from the device’s beneficial attributes, and to rely 
upon as predicates for liability. 
The public can exaggerate the harms associated with an 
innovation; this problem is, I believe, well understood, and 
forms part of the basic critique of tort law as it applies to 
innovation.56  One hears less about the tendency to 
underestimate the dangers created by a new practice or 
device; yet this too can occur.  A positive aura that surrounds 
an innovation can cloak its unnecessarily risky features, at 
least for a time. 
Here, consider two relatively recent innovations: hybrid 
vehicles and Tasers.  In 2000, Toyota sold its first Prius 
vehicles in the United States.57  The Prius, like other hybrid 
and electric vehicles, comes equipped with a quirk: it is very 
 
 54. See Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Washington, 746 P.2d 1198, 1200 
(Wash. 1987) (relating that “The modern trend followed by a majority of states 
is to impose liability [for ground damage] only upon a showing of negligence by 
either the aircraft owner or operator,” and citing cases from other jurisdictions).  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts declines to take a position on whether strict 
liability applies to these circumstances, however.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS § 20 reporter’s note (2010). 
 55. For a discussion of how inertia and path dependence (both in its formal, 
stare decisis sense and in its other dimensions) can deter changes in the law, see 
generally Hathaway, supra note 33. 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 10409. 
 57. Andrew Pollack, It’s Easier to Be Green, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at 
AU1. 
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quiet, especially while being operated at low speeds.  So quiet, 
that research has found that these vehicles may pose a 
danger to unsuspecting pedestrians and bicyclists.58  Ten 
years after the first Prius hit the streets, President Obama 
signed legislation that will require these vehicles to produce 
an alert noise.59  In the interim, however, not a single 
reported case decision appeared in which the lack of noise on 
a hybrid or electric vehicle was attacked as a product defect.60 
It is possible that no Prius or other hybrid vehicle ever 
snuck up on an unsuspecting jogger during this span.61  But 
perhaps the public simply was not conditioned to appreciate 
that the lack of noise associated with hybrid vehicles 
amounted to an unreasonable and avoidable risk.  Hybrid 
vehicles are desirable, on balance; it may take time to 
recognize that we need not accept the bitter in order to gain 
the benefit of the sweet.  On a “micro-” level, the jogger just 
discussed may grasp that he had been struck by a Prius, but 
will likely assign blame to the driver, rather than to the lack 
of a noisemaking device on the vehicle. 
While personal injuries caused by hybrid-car accidents 
are speculative, injuries associated with Tasers are quite 
well-documented.62  Even so, it has taken time to grasp the 
 
 58. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, INCIDENCE 
OF PEDESTRIAN AND BICYCLIST CRASHES BY HYBRID ELECTRIC PASSENGER 
VEHICLES 3 (2009) (concluding that hybrid and electric vehicles “have a higher 
incidence rate of pedestrian and bicyclist crashes than do [internal combustion 
engine] vehicles in certain vehicle maneuvers”); Sarah Simpson, Didn’t Hear It 
Coming: Must hybrid cars be louder to be safe for pedestrians?, SCI. AM., Aug. 
2008, at 22.  The risks presented by the silence of hybrid vehicles had been the 
subject of anecdotal reports for years prior to the preparation of these reports.  
See, e.g., Gary Richards, Quiet hybrids pose an ‘invisible’ risk, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2006, at A1 (discussing concerns to this effect that had 
been raised by representatives of the National Federation of the Blind). 
 59. Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 841, Pub. L. 111-373 
(Jan. 4, 2011). 
 60. As based on a review of the Westlaw ALLCASES database, September 
2011. 
 61. But see NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra 
note 58, at 19 (concluding that hybrid and electric vehicles “have a higher 
incidence rate of pedestrian and bicyclist crashes than do [internal combustion 
engine] vehicles in certain vehicle maneuvers.”). 
 62. AMNESTY INT’L, EXCESSIVE AND LETHAL FORCE?  AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS ABOUT DEATHS AND ILL-TREATMENT INVOLVING 
POLICE USE OF TASERS (2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en 
/library/asset/AMR51/139/2004/en/48fc6252-d581-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/amr5 
11392004en.html. 
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preventable risks associated with these devices.  Only over 
the past few years has a distinction been drawn between 
those situations in which Tasers offer a preferable means of 
non-lethal force, and those in which their use may be 
regarded as improper.63  These distinctions have served as the 
predicate for the ongoing surge of lawsuits against the 
manufacturer of Tasers—most of which allege a failure to 
adequately warn of the product’s dangers when used in 
certain assertedly “unreasonable” circumstances.64 
As background, a Taser is a branded “conducted energy 
device” that uses an electric current to disable a target.  
These devices have been sold since the mid-1970s.65  Today, 
they are most closely associated with a particular model line, 
marketed as the “Taser.”66  According to Taser International, 
the manufacturer of Tasers, around 590,000 of these devices 
have been sold to law enforcement agencies as of 2011.67  
Tasers have been marketed as a less-violent alternative to 
lethal force.  This pitch has proved persuasive; by 2004, more 
than 4,000 police departments across the United States used 
Tasers.68  That same year, however, a spate of newspaper 
articles69 and an Amnesty International report70 raised 
concerns about whether law-enforcement officers were using 
these devices properly.  Some of these critiques, and others 
that followed,71 also questioned whether Taser International 
 
 63. See JAMES M. CRONIN & JOSHUA A. EDERHEIMER, CONDUCTED ENERGY 
DEVICES: DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR CONSISTENCY AND GUIDELINES 
2329 (2006) (proposing guidelines for Taser use). 
 64. TASER INT’L, INC., ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K, YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 2010 50 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1069183/000095012311025257/c13977e10vk.htm (relating 
that most of the pending products-liability lawsuits against the corporation, to 
the extent that they involve their Taser product, involve a failure to warn). 
 65. Los Angeles Police Get Nonlethal Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1980, at 28; 
Fred Ferretti, Zap!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1976, at SM4; AMNESTY INT’L, supra 
note 62.  As of 1985, only eight major police departments used these devices.  
Defensive Use of Stun Guns Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1985, at 43. 
 66. CRONIN & EDERHEIMER, supra note 63, at 3. 
 67. Press Kit, TASER INTERNATIONAL, http://www.taser.com/press-kit (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 68. Sarah Kershaw, As Shocks Replace Police Bullets, Deaths Drop but 
Questions Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at N1. 
 69. E.g., Alex Berenson, As Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions over Safety 
Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at N1; Kershaw, supra note 68, at N1. 
 70. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 62. 
 71. E.g., Allison Torres Burtka, Electric shock from tasers can injure and 
kill, lawsuits claim, TRIAL, May 2005. 
4_GRAHAM FINAL 12/1/2012  5:52 PM 
2012] ASSIMILATION OF INNOVATIONS 1259 
was issuing proper warnings and instructions to these 
officers.72
 These reports may have caused a change in public 
opinion with regard to Tasers, or they may have merely 
documented this shift.  What is clear is that there were very 
few product-liability lawsuits against the makers of 
conducted energy devices prior to the public discussion of the 
avoidable harms caused by Tasers, and quite a few 
contemporaneously and afterwards.  The first products-
liability case against a conducted energy device manufacturer 
to appear in the Westlaw federal and state caselaw database 
(ALLCASES) was brought in the mid-1980s, leading to an 
opinion in September 1987.
 
73  The next opinion in such a case, 
as contained within the database, appeared fully 18 years 
later, in September 2005.74  Since 2004, more than 100 
lawsuits have alleged either improper use of a Taser, product-
liability theories against Taser International, or both.75  As of 
March 2011, the company was named as a defendant in 51 
ongoing personal injury or wrongful death lawsuits.76
The vast majority of the lawsuits against Taser 
International have failed.
 
77
 
 72. A 2006 report on conducted energy devices, prepared by the Department 
of Justice, summarized the concerns that had come to surround Tasers by that 
time.  In describing its genesis, the report explained: 
  But the simple fact of the 
lawsuits, and their delayed timing relative to the initial 
appearance of Tasers, is for present purposes much more 
significant than the case outcomes to date. With both hybrid 
Advocacy organizations raised questions about the devices, claiming 
they were being misused, overused, and posed serious health risks.  
Policy issues emerged on a plethora of concerns ranging from 
placement on the force continuum to activation parameters on at-risk 
populations such as children, the elderly, persons under the influence 
of drugs, and pregnant women.  Training questions arose, especially 
about the mandatory exposure of police officers to these devices.  
Tactical issues surfaced, ranging from holster placement to the practice 
of activating persons in vehicles.  The medical effects of CEDs were—
and remain—controversial because some people have died in proximity 
to a CED activation. 
CRONIN & EDERHEIMER, supra note 63, at 4. 
 73. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 669 F. Supp. 307 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
 74. Sanders v. City of Fresno, 2005 WL 2435893 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005). 
 75. NEWS RELEASE: JURY AWARD FOR PLAINTIFF IN TURNER V. TASER 
INTERNATIONAL (2011), available at http://investor.taser.com/phoenix 
.zhtml?c=129937&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1586646&highlight=. 
 76. TASER INT’L, INC., supra note 64, at 49. 
 77. Id. 
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vehicles and Tasers, prospective plaintiffs simply lacked 
substantial “claim consciousness” for some period of time 
after the product’s initial development and dissemination.78 
IV. EARLY ADOPTERS 
Fourth, there exists a tendency, in early accidents that 
involve a novel device, to focus on the behavior of its 
consumers, whose conduct may be easier to map against 
prevailing standards of care than that of the product’s 
manufacturers.  In suits brought by users themselves, the law 
often regards early adopters as taking their chances with a 
technology.  Meanwhile, in situations in which a third party 
might bring suit, responsibility for the harm may be shifted 
away from the technology itself and toward the user’s 
decisions vis-à-vis the innovation. 
This “blaming the user” dynamic appeared during the 
dawn of the automobile.  By any standard, early automobiles 
contained many serious defects.79  For example, the December 
1, 1900, issue of Scientific American casually remarked upon 
the fact that “[m]any accidents have occurred on account of 
the tires becoming detached from the steering wheels of 
automobiles, and too much attention cannot be paid to this 
matter.”80  Yet even basic features of automotive technology 
were indefinite and difficult to critique during this era.81  This 
 
 78. See Galanter, supra note 16, at 377 (discussing the importance of 
grievance awareness in catalyzing lawsuits). 
 79. Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the 
Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (“At 
least until 1904, the automobile’s rudimentary character created many 
technological defects.”). 
 80. Automobile News, SCI. AM., Dec. 1, 1900, at 342. 
 81. The large number of manufacturers that tend to appear in the early 
phases of industry development also may complicate efforts to appreciate and 
critique a product’s design.  See DAVID BLANKE, HELL ON WHEELS: THE 
PROMISE AND PERIL OF AMERICA’S CAR CULTURE, 1900–1940 20 (2007) 
(observing that as of 1908, there were 253 manufacturers of automobiles, 
although some of these manufacturers were, in fact, simply glorified parts 
assemblers); KIMES, supra note 7, at 91 (relating an official estimate that as of 
1899, 30 automobile producers manufactured 2,500 vehicles); Michael Gort & 
Steven Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations, 92 ECON. J. 
630, 651 (1982) (discussing how there often exist a relatively large number of 
product manufacturers at early stages of industry development, with 
participants dropping out as the industry matures).  In theory, design diversity 
would seem to benefit plaintiffs, in that this variety would tend to present 
reasonable alternatives to the defendant’s design choice.  But this assumes a 
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being the case, when problems appeared with early 
automobiles, “it [was] not always possible to say with 
absolute certainty whether a breakage or other accident [was] 
due to defects in construction or improper operation.”82  In 
these situations, the definite tendency was to assign fault to 
the user, rather than engage in a probing review of the 
technology.  The sin of speeding received special scrutiny, 
being blamed for many early automobile accidents.83  In this 
spirit, The New York Times related in a 1904 editorial that 
the automobile “is dangerous only when run imprudently or 
recklessly—less dangerous, indeed, than horses ever were or 
are ever likely to be.”84 
Speeding was blamed even for accidents that seem, in 
hindsight, to have been caused by an obvious mechanical 
issue.  One 1904 Horseless Age story reported, “During the 
past few weeks the daily papers have been full of reports of 
automobile accidents, and one remarkable feature of these 
reports has been that in the vast majority of them the cause 
of the trouble is stated to have been connected with the 
steering gear.”85  This diagnosis seemed quite sound, given 
that in these accidents, either pins were falling out of the 
steering gear, or the steering gear simply broke.86  The 
article’s author begged to differ, offering the opinion: “Now, 
while a mishap to the steering gear is very likely to cause a 
 
fairly well-defined and advanced cause of action.  Prior to that time, a range of 
designs may make it unclear what the basic nature of the product is, and thus 
what its design should be.  See KIMES, supra note 7, at 164 (observing that, in 
the early years of automobile development, “[t]here was no really definitive 
answer to what an automobile should be yet and some bizarre notions of what it 
might be.”).  Id. at 165 (discussing the early divide among steam-, electric-, and 
gasoline-powered automobiles).  Also, the high attrition rate among 
corporations that marks early industrial development begs the question of 
whether companies participating in nascent industries are likely to be deterred 
by the remote prospect of tort liability if they happen to be one of the few, 
fortunate surviving entities. 
 82. Irresponsible Guarantees, supra note 13, at 48. 
 83. See, e.g., The Automobile, S.F. CALL, Sept. 14, 1902, at 22 (calling for 
stricter regulation of speeding in the wake of a fatal automobile accident); 
Recent Automobile Accidents, SCI. AM., Nov. 9, 1901, at 290 (“we wish to draw 
attention to the fact that a mere acquaintance with the management and 
control [of an automobile] under normal conditions, does not qualify the owner 
as an expert under all-round conditions.”). 
 84. The American Automobile, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1904, at 8. 
 85. A New Explanation of Speed Accidents, THE HORSELESS AGE, Aug. 3, 
1904, at 98. 
 86. Id. 
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serious accident, it is hard to believe that the steering gears 
of so many cars are so carelessly constructed that they break 
or drop to pieces on the road.”87  Instead, the article 
continued, “we are rather inclined to think that the greater 
portion of these accidents are simply the result of reckless 
driving, mostly by comparative novices.”88 
Passenger air travel offers another example of “blaming 
the user” while a technology gradually transitions from an 
extravagance to a necessity.  Most early air passengers either 
chartered planes or paid “barnstormers” for short trips up in 
the air.89  The pilots on these journeys hardly claimed spotless 
safety records; these flights—or, more accurately, the 
unplanned cessation of these flights—led to a significant 
number of injuries and deaths.  Between 1921 and 1923, 
there were 470 reported civilian airplane accidents, resulting 
in 221 deaths and 391 injuries.90  Nevertheless, for a quarter-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Routine scheduled passenger air traffic did not take off until the late 
1920s.  By 1929, scheduled air-service lines carried 173,405 passengers, up from 
5782 in 1926.  ROGER E. BILSTEIN, FLIGHT IN AMERICA 57 (3d ed. 2001).  See 
also THOMAS HART KENNEDY, INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF AIR 
TRANSPORTATION 5657 (1944) (describing the factors behind the boom in 
passenger air traffic in the late 1920s).  Prior to that time, except as to a 
handful of routes in which airplanes could soar over water hazards, early 
aircraft were too slow, and their flying radius too limited, to compete with 
railroads and automobiles.  R.E.G. DAVIES, AIRLINES OF THE UNITED STATES 
SINCE 1914 45 (1972) (discussing the obstacles that hindered the development 
of commercial flight in the United States).  The first regularly scheduled air 
passenger route connected Tampa and St. Petersburg, Florida, and commenced 
service in 1914.  R.E.G. Davies, The Birth of Commercial Aviation in the United 
States, 78 REVUE BELGE DE PHILOLOGIE ET D’HISTORIE 993, 99496 (2000). 
 90. AERONAUTICAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF AM., INC., THE AIRCRAFT 
YEAR BOOK FOR 1924 103 (1924).  If contemporary accounts can be credited, the 
accident rate associated with early flight was positively sky-high, especially 
among so-called “gypsy” (itinerant) pilots.  According to one Scientific American 
article, the approximately 600 to 650 civilian airplanes in the hands of gypsy 
pilots in 1922 were involved in 122 accidents that year.  The Demand for Air 
Laws, SCI. AM., Aug. 1923, at 84.  The “deplorable and unnecessary loss of life” 
associated with journeyman fliers had grown so troublesome that by mid-1923 
Scientific American joined aircraft manufacturers, and several operators of 
small airlines, in calling for federal regulation of aviation.  Id.  Though there 
was a lull in air traffic in 1924 and 1925, industry resurgence following the 
enactment of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 568, May 20, 1926) 
produced a concomitant increase in passenger deaths and injuries. According to 
the Department of Commerce, the first six months of 1929 witnessed 116 
passenger fatalities associated with civil air transportation, along with eighty-
nine severe injuries and eighty minor injuries.  AERONAUTICAL CHAMBER OF 
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century after the Wright brothers’ first flight there were no 
published decisions in which recovery in tort was sought for 
passenger injuries or deaths due to a plane crash.91  
Surveying the field in the late 1920s, one observer wrote, 
“Liability to passengers is, with the exception of Connecticut 
and probably Massachusetts, a wide open question, the 
decision of which will have great bearing on the development 
of aircraft.”92 
What accounted for this dearth of caselaw?  One 1929 
commentator associated the lack of lawsuits with the public’s 
benign view toward airplanes, surmising that “Although few 
subjects offer as fertile a field for legal study as the problem 
of an aviator’s tort liability, a general attitude of kindly 
tolerance toward all things aeronautical has kept this topic so 
far chiefly one for academic discussion.”93  Perhaps this was 
 
COMMERCE OF AM., INC., THE AIRCRAFT YEAR BOOK FOR 1930 508 (1930); Air 
Commerce Act of 1926, 69 Pub. L. No. 254, 44 Stat. 568. 
 91. The first published appellate decision in a lawsuit brought by a 
passenger (or their estate) that attacked the negligent operation of an airplane 
appeared in 1929.  Hough v. Curtiss Flying Service (1929), U.S. Av. Rep. 99 
(Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1929).  The Hough decision was followed in short order by 
Greunke v. North American Airways Co., 230 N.W. 618 (Wis. 1930) and Smith v. 
New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930).  Beforehand, there had 
been a number of published decisions that involved claims brought under 
insurance policies in the wake of air accidents, most of which were resolved 
against the insured.  E.g., Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 1 S.W.2d 99 
(Mo. 1927); North Am. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 104 So. 21 (Ala. 1925); Meredith v. 
Business Men’s Acc. Ass’n of America, 252 S.W.2d 976 (Mo. App. 1923); 
Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Peake, 89 So. 418 (Fla. 1921); Bew v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 
112 A. 859 (N.J. Err. & App. 1921).  There also had been a few cases involving 
injuries to bystanders at air shows, for example, Morrison v. Fisher, 152 N.W. 
475 (Wis. 1915), and the author has located one early, apparently unpublished 
case that involved a midair collision between two airplanes.  Air “Traffic Laws” 
Cited, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1925, at A1. 
 92. Chuster W. Cuthell, Book Note, 37 YALE L.J. 687, 688 (1928) (reviewing 
Rowland W. Fixel, Law of Aviation (1927)).  Connecticut and Massachusetts 
both had enacted statutes that related liability rules for injuries suffered as a 
result of airplane crashes.  An Act Concerning the Registration, Numbering, 
and Use of Air Ships, and the Licensing of Operators Thereof, CONN. STATS. 
1911, ch. 86, § 11 (“Every aeronaut shall be responsible for all damages suffered 
in this state by any person from injuries caused by any voyage in an air ship 
directed by such aeronaut.”); An Act to Regulate the Use of Air Craft, Acts and 
Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts, 1913, ch. 663, § 6 (providing 
that an aviator “shall be held liable for injuries resulting from his flying unless 
he can demonstrate that he had taken every reasonable precaution to prevent 
such injury”). 
 93. Arthur R. Newman, II, Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases, 29 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1929). 
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true.  It seems more likely, however, that prospective 
plaintiffs sensed that they were unlikely to recover in any 
lawsuit they might file. 
In the early 1900s, potential cases that would allege 
injuries or death arising out of air travel suffered from two 
substantial impediments.  First, many of the early air 
carriers likely could not pay any judgment that might be 
awarded against them.  A large share of these operators 
hovered on the precipice of insolvency.94  And, glamorous 
though they were, barnstormers made for terrible defendants.  
They too were generally cash-strapped, and had the 
unfortunate habit of dying in the very same crashes that 
might have led to lawsuits.  Second, an early airplane 
passenger was understood to be courting danger.95  One 
itinerant pilot described the sort of plane typically flown by 
his fellow “gypsy” aviator as “usually in poor condition, due to 
the fact that he has no shelter for it and as a rule cannot 
afford to repair it unless absolutely necessary.  More often 
than not it was a condemned war training plane when he 
bought it.”96  Prospective plaintiffs thus must have 
anticipated a robust assumption of the risk or contributory 
negligence defense in the event of any suit. 
Even when state-of-the-art planes and more substantial 
airline concerns were involved, there remained a sense that 
passengers might be taking a substantial risk simply by 
leaving the ground.  At a minimum, the boundaries of 
contributory negligence were ill-defined, and potentially 
expansive.  One commentator wondered aloud in 1929, “Let 
us assume that a passenger engages an airplane and takes off 
in the midst of a severe storm and fog.  It would be negligent 
for the pilot to take off under such conditions.  Would it not be 
contributorily negligent for a passenger to engage in the 
flight?  It would seem so, and he should be barred from 
recovering for any resultant damages.”97  Similar concerns did 
 
 94. Only 17 of the 88 operators listed in the 1921 annual report of the 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce could be found among the 129 operators 
listed in the analogous report of two years later.  HENRY LADD SMITH, AIRWAYS: 
THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 88 (1942). 
 95. See, e.g., ROGER E. BILSTEIN, FLIGHT PATTERNS: TRENDS OF 
AERONAUTICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 19181929 62 (1983) 
(describing early perceptions of barnstormers and their patrons). 
 96. The Gypsy Flier’s Viewpoint, AVIATION, Jan. 22, 1923, at 103. 
 97. Newman, supra note 93, at 1049.  See also W. JEFFERSON DAVIS, 
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not have to rise to the level of an absolute defense to deter 
lawsuits; due to the perceived riskiness of flight, many 
injured plaintiffs, or their next of kin, likely never considered 
themselves as having a valid claim in tort.  Only when 
passenger flight became a relatively unremarkable and 
widespread occurrence did a sense develop that the 
experience did not, and should not, involve a healthy dose of 
assumed risk. 
When air-passenger lawsuits finally commenced in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, the plaintiffs in these cases did 
not invariably name the manufacturers of the downed 
airplanes as defendants.  Why not?  In addition to the 
difficulties associated with proving negligent manufacture 
(and the unavailability of a strict products-liability claim in 
that era98), here again there appeared a tendency to blame 
users, not the machine.99  Take, for example, the investigation 
and court proceedings that stemmed from one of the first 
major passenger air disasters, a March 1929 crash of a Ford 
airplane in Newark, New Jersey, in which more than a dozen 
people died.100  The official investigation found that one 
engine on the doomed airplane failed shortly after takeoff, 
and that another may have failed later.  To a modern trial 
lawyer, these facts would suggest a potentially defective 
engine, and perhaps a claim of negligent manufacture—
especially because the uncontroverted testimony was that the 
engine had been properly serviced by the airline.101  Back 
then, blame for the accident was placed squarely on the pilot’s 
 
AERONAUTICAL LAW 295 (1930) (“It would appear that one taking flight in an 
airplane assumes certain apparent risks in this mode of travel which are of 
greater hazard than travel on land or water.”). 
 98. Acceptance of strict products liability was more than three decades in 
the future.  See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 
1963). 
 99. 13 Killed in Sightseeing Plane Crash; Huge Ship Cut in Two on a 
Railway Car as It Falls in the Jersey Meadows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1929, at 1 
(relating a 1928 Navy report that attributed most airplane crashes to date to 
“the human factor”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. One of the plaintiffs’ claims was that the airline had permitted “the 
motors and other parts of the plane to become defective, unsecured, and 
insufficient.”  Boele v. Colonial W. Airways, 164 A. 436, 437 (N.J. Ct. Err. & 
App. 1933).  However, the appellate court determined that “The defendant, no 
doubt, proved that the plane had been properly serviced and inspected from the 
time of its purchase new.”  Id. 
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shoulders.  In the minds of investigators, “the man more than 
the machine was the cause of the casualties.”102  This 
conclusion flavored the lawsuit that followed, in which only 
the airline and its servants—not Ford—were named as 
defendants.103 
V. THE TWO FACES OF UNCERTAINTY 
This Article’s fifth point is a bit more general than those 
that precede it, and in some respects builds upon and follows 
from these assertions.  Simply put, this final principle holds 
that as to any particular innovation, it is exceedingly difficult 
to ascertain in advance whether, and for how long, those 
recurring themes within tort law’s application to innovation 
that tend to produce a “grace” period for an invention will 
predominate over those tendencies that may have the 
opposite effect. 
One side of this ledger already has been discussed.  This 
Article has related how the first batch of tort suits that 
implicate an invention may allege what ultimately prove to be 
idiosyncratic claims, as to which judges prescribe what in 
hindsight prove to be a permissive set of rules; how early 
lawsuits may be stymied by difficulties in pinpointing the 
unreasonably hazardous accoutrements of an innovation; and 
how a tendency exists to ascribe responsibility for harms 
associated with a new technology to its early users, instead of 
the innovation itself.  Put together, these principles form a 
rough argument that tort law sometimes (though not always) 
blesses innovations with a “honeymoon” period, in which the 
necessary information, doctrine, and expectations do not exist 
to assimilate grievances that involve these inventions into 
everyday torts practice. 
But there exists another side to the story.  According to 
conventional wisdom, tort law routinely penalizes innovation, 
while rewarding manufacturers who adhere to the status quo.  
The leading article in this vein is Peter Huber’s Safety and 
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in 
the Courts.104  In this article, Huber posits that, as a general 
 
 102. Aeronautics: Flights & Fliers, TIME, Apr. 8, 1929, at 18. 
 103. Boele, 164 A. at 436; Ziser v. Colonial W. Airways, 162 A. 591, 591 (N.J. 
Sup. 1932). 
 104. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk 
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matter, “courts . . . greatly prefer natural, old, or established 
hazards to those deriving from new technologies.”105  
According to Huber, more tort suits are directed against 
innovations than is warranted by the risks these technologies 
generate, as compared to the hazards posed by more-
entrenched substitutes.106  Huber credits this disparity to 
both a sort of cognitive dissonance among courts and the 
general public, and to a surfeit of information regarding the 
risks posed by new technologies.  As to the former, Huber 
surmises that 
judges and juries, like most people unfamiliar with the 
quantitative aspects of risk, routinely assume that new 
and less familiar hazards are graver than they really are, 
and that older, more common ones are less severe.  The 
risk-creator’s conduct inevitably looks very much more 
reasonable when it produces familiar and entrenched 
hazards than when it creates novel ones.107 
As to the latter, Huber observes that “the amount of 
information regarding relatively new risks is usually much 
greater than the amount of information regarding old 
ones,”108 due to the information-generating character of the 
regulatory vetting that sometimes precedes an innovation’s 
introduction into the market.109 
 
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). 
 105. Id. at 307. 
 106. Id. at 317. 
 107. Id. at 319. 
 108. Id. at 318. 
 109. Huber and others would reiterate and amplify these critiques over the 
next decade.  See, e.g., Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones, eds., PRODUCT 
LIABILITY AND INNOVATION (1994); THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF 
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan 
eds., 1991); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 15374 (1988).  More recently, in their article Torts and 
Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008), Professors Alex Stein and Gideon 
Parchamovsky perceive a systemic bias against innovation within tort doctrine.  
According to Stein and Parchamovsky, this bias results from the role of custom 
in ascertaining negligence.  More specifically, when considering whether a party 
acted negligently, courts and juries may consider (among other matters) 
whether they adhered to or departed from customary practices.  Id. at 291.  
Here, adherence to custom may bespeak reasonable behavior, while a departure 
from custom may signify unreasonable conduct.  Id.  Since a departure from 
custom may amount to negligence, Stein and Parchamovsky reason, those who 
adopt innovations tend to be held liable for negligence more often than those 
who do not.  Id. at 294.  As a result, the “reliance on customs and conventional 
technologies as the benchmark for assigning tort liability chills innovation and 
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This Article essay leaves a full critique of Huber’s thesis 
for another day.  At a minimum, however, if one examines the 
historical record, one quickly discovers that Huber’s 
argument applies to some innovations far better than it does 
to others.  Information regarding the hazards associated with 
new technologies is often quite limited, relative to the data 
that surrounds their more well-entrenched substitutes.  For 
example, in 1900, almost every American experienced the 
dangers (and other disagreeable qualities) of horses on a daily 
basis.110  Meanwhile, the public at that time appreciated that 
automobiles might be dangerous, but many observers 
associated these perils with irresponsible use, instead of 
perceiving them as being inherent in the technology itself.  
And as discussed elsewhere in this Article, other technologies 
also have benefitted, early on in their diffusion, from the 
perception that they were less risky than they ultimately 
proved to be, or that those who adopted these innovations 
were taking their chances in doing so.  As to any specific 
invention, it may be impossible to anticipate whether these 
forces will subsidize the method or device in its incipiency, or 
whether the dynamics that Huber describes will prevail. 
A related limitation of Huber’s thesis is that, insofar as it 
suggests that uncertainty regarding potential liability tends 
to stymie innovation, it overlooks the fact that uncertainty 
can cut two ways.  Uncertainty as to the prospect, viability, 
and magnitude of tort claims regarding an invention may 
chill its development or diffusion.  But uncertainty as to 
matters such as the existence of a cause of action and the 
 
distorts its path.”  Id. at 286.  Stein and Parchamovsky’s view has been 
critiqued as overstating the importance of custom in shaping litigation 
outcomes.  George L. Priest, The Effects of Modern Tort Law on Innovation and 
Economic Growth, in THE KAUFMANN TASK FORCE ON LAW, INNOVATION AND 
GROWTH, RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH 
THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 273, 283 (2011). 
 110. See Morris, supra note 32, at 5 (relating that circa 1880, horses 
deposited approximately 4,000,000 pounds of manure and 40,000 gallons of 
urine in city streets and city stables every day, across New York and Brooklyn).  
Id. at 6 (reciting the number of deaths attributed to horses in New York City in 
1900).  Meanwhile, other alternative forms of transportation of that era also 
were understood as responsible for a large number of accidents, and deaths.  
City Averages a Homicide a Week, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1908, at 14 (relating the 
annual report of the San Francisco coroner, which ascribed 109 deaths to steam, 
electric, and cable cars during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, as compared 
to 14 deaths due to automobile accidents during this span). 
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likelihood of recovery also may stifle the filing of claims that 
attack the innovation as unreasonably dangerous.111  The 
dialogue that has surrounded tort law and innovation to date 
has dwelled upon courtroom dynamics that supposedly 
penalize new technologies, and the concerns that product 
manufacturers have about these forces.  Perhaps comparable 
attention should be paid to the pre-filing thought processes of 
prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys.  By making this 
effort, we eventually may gain a more nuanced 
understanding of how tort law interacts with innovation, and 
appreciate which sorts of technologies produce “too many” 
lawsuits, and which, “too few.”  As matters stand, all that can 
be said with confidence is that, depending upon the direction 
that (and how deeply) uncertainty cuts, particular 
innovations may have an initial competitive advantage, or 
disadvantage, relative to better-established substitute 
technologies. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
I began this piece by stating that, when it comes to 
predicting the interplay between tort law and new 
technologies, nobody knows anything. My thesis would suffer 
from a certain inconsistency were I to offer any definite 
predictions here regarding the reception that autonomous 
vehicles are likely to receive. Nevertheless, I can offer some 
caveated suppositions, all of which will assume that 
autonomous vehicles will eventually, if gradually, find a mass 
market. 
At the outset, I believe that the types of tort claims 
associated with autonomous vehicles will evolve over time. 
Early claims likely will resemble contemporary lawsuits that 
allege negligent vehicle use.112  These cases will probably also 
 
 111. Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 
CORN. L. REV. 941, 949 (1995) (observing that uncertainties associated with 
recovery have the effect of “increas[ing] the cost of filing and litigating claims 
[and] discourag[ing] meritorious claimants”); Galanter, supra note 16, at 389 
(discussing how the rules that surround a particular type of tort claim, and 
lawyer expertise in evaluating potential lawsuits that would allege that claim, 
mature over time). 
 112. As Professor Marchant notes, some such claims might resemble the fact 
pattern in Brouse v. U.S., 83 F. Supp. 373, 374 (D. Ohio 1949), in which a pilot 
was faulted for not maintaining a proper lookout while engaging the autopilot 
function.  Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 1325. 
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involve a relatively “passive” plaintiff class; that is to say, 
plaintiffs who did not knowingly expose themselves to any of 
the potential novel risks generated by these vehicles.  As 
basic ground rules regarding the use of autonomous vehicles 
emerge, so too will new causes of action.  The first such 
claims likely will continue to ascribe fault to the users of 
autonomous vehicles, drawing distinctions between “proper” 
and “improper” use premised on the slowly accumulating 
body of knowledge on this topic.  Some of these claims may 
lack analogues in current torts practice.  For example, 
perhaps plaintiffs will attack decisions to utilize autonomous 
vehicles in specific areas where experience has shown that 
they present relatively significant dangers. 
When suits against the manufacturers of autonomous 
automobiles first appear, they likely will sound in a failure to 
warn of some danger associated with vehicle use, as opposed 
to a design defect.  For a plaintiff to reach a jury on a design-
defect claim, she may have to engage in a searching review of 
the computer code that directs the movement of these 
vehicles.  This project may be difficult, and expensive.  
Warning-defect claims would seem, on the whole, to be easier 
to grasp and prosecute, and represent more logical candidates 
for user defendants looking to foist blame onto another party. 
On the whole, I am more optimistic than Professor 
Marchant appears to be about the interplay between tort law 
and autonomous vehicles.  It is possible that the development 
of these vehicles will succumb to an onslaught of tort suits, or 
that the prospect of ruinous liability will chill investment to 
the point that research on these devices stalls.  But I doubt it.  
Assaults on this technology may not be intuitive, and the 
types of claims especially feared by Professor Marchant will 
emerge only gradually, if ever, such that the technology will 
have an opportunity to evolve and further reduce its risk 
profile prior to encountering a wave of tort litigation.  It 
strikes me as at least as likely that autonomous vehicles will 
benefit from a “honeymoon period,” and even after that span 
expires, the innovations incorporated within autonomous 
vehicles may confer upon them a competitive advantage 
relative to conventional automobiles—which, after all, also 
may be attacked insofar as they fail to incorporate the safety-
enhancing devices that appear within autonomous cars. 
But, then again, nobody knows anything. 
